巴菲特眼中的市场先生(上)

2017-03-17 13:29 7heaHAN 阅读 53251

Views on the market and where it's going?

您对市场的看法以及您觉得市场将何去何从?

I have no idea were the market is going to go. I prefer it going down. But my preferences have nothing to do with it. The market knows nothing about my feelings. That is one of the first things you have to learn about a stock. 

我也不知道市场的走向是什么,我更倾向于认为它在走下坡路。但我的个人喜好与之无关。反过来市场也了解不了我是怎么想的。这其实也是你踏足股市的时候所要学到的第一课。

Clipboard Image.png

You buy 100 shares of General Motors (GM). Now all of a sudden you have this feeling about GM. It goes down, you may be mad at it. You may say, "Well, if it just goes up for what I paid for it, my life will be wonderful again." Or if it goes up, you may say how smart you were and how you and GM have this love affair. You have got all these feelings. The stock doesn't know you own it.

你买了通用汽车100股,之后突然有一天你开始看衰通用汽车,股价开始下跌。可能你那个时候会很抓狂,你可能会说“好吧,如果这支股票按照我的购买预期所上涨的话,我的生活早就能阳光灿烂。”若股价上涨,你会因你的购入行为而自诩聪明。只不过你所有的这些感觉这支股票本身并不知道。

The stock just sits there; it doesn't care what you paid or the fact that you own it. Any feeling I have about the market is not reciprocated. I mean it is the ultimate cold shoulder we are talking about here. Practically anybody in this room is probably more likely to be a net buyer of stocks over the next ten years than they are a net seller, so everyone of you should prefer lower prices. 

不管你买股票的理由是什么,不管你为之投入了多少资金,股票本身只想静静,并不在意这些。任何我对股票所持有的看法都不能在感性层面上由股票本身来反馈。所以这是个在情感上极其冷淡的话题。实际上任何在场的人士在未来十年内相对于做股票的净卖家还是更乐意做净购买者。所以你们肯定喜欢更低的买入价。

If you are a net eater of hamburger over the next ten years, you want hamburger to go down unless you are a cattle producer. If you are going to be a buyer of Coca-Cola and you don't own Coke stock, you hope the price of Coke goes down. You are looking for it to be on sale this weekend at your Supermarket. You want it to be down on the weekends not up on the weekends when you tend the Supermarket.

举例来说如果你只是一个汉堡包的消费者你肯定乐于看到汉堡价钱越低越好,除非你是养肉牛的。如果你是买可乐的,手头也没持有可口可乐的股票你肯定希望可乐降价。像是在你家附近的超市有个神马周末促销之类的。

The NYSE is one big supermarket of companies. And you are going to be buying stocks, what you want to have happen?You want to have those stocks go down, way down; you will make better buys then. Later on twenty or thirty years from now when you are in a period when you are dis-saving, or when your heirs dis-save for you, then you may care about higher prices. 

纽约证交所就像一个在货架上有各种公司的大超市。当你去买股票的的时候你希望发生什么?你希望股价低低的,你就能多买点。二三十年之后当你不慎开始入不敷出,或你的法定继承人们开始啃老,你就该开始关注这个股价有木有涨起来。

There is Chapter 8 in Graham's Intelligent Investor about the attitude toward stock market fluctuations, that and Chapter 20 on the Margin of Safety are the two most important essays ever written on investing as far as I am concerned. 

在Graham所著的《聪明的投资者》的第8章里提到了对于股票市场波动的态度和《安全边际》的第20章里的内容在我看来是关于投资的最有参考价值的两篇论述。

Because when I read Chapter 8 when I was 19, I figured out what I just said but it is obvious, but I didn't figure it out myself. It was explained to me.I probably would have gone another 100 years and still thought it was good when my stocks were going up. We want things to go down, but I have no idea what the stock market is going to do. I never do and I never will. It is not something I think about at all.

因为当我19岁的时候读到《聪明的投资者》的第8章的时候,里面的内容给了我莫大的启发,否则再过100年我也会单纯的觉得我买的股票股价上涨是件好事。我们想让他们下挫,但我还是不明白股票市场本身会发生什么,我也不敢贸然出手去做,这一点也不像我之前所思考过的事情。

When it goes down, I look harder at what I might buy that day because I know there is more likely to be some merchandise there to use my money effectively in.

当股价下挫,我会更加关注我想买入的股票,因为它可能会更贴近实际的投资价值,从而使得我的投资更高效。

Source: Lecture at the University of Florida Business School

Time: October 15th 1998

来源:佛罗里达商学院演讲

时间:1998年10月15日

---------------------------------------------------

WB: I could expand on that question, but I couldn’t answer it. Charlie and I haven’t the faintest idea where it goes next week, next month or next year. We are not in that business. It isn’t our game. We see thousands of companies priced every day. We ignore 99% of what we see. 

WB:我可以扩展这个问题的范围但是我回答不了。Charlie和我都没法断定市场在下一年,下个月,甚至哪怕是下一周的走向,这不是我们所关心的,也不是我们所能操盘的游戏。我们每天会过目上千所公司的股价,其中99%我们都会忽略掉。

Every now and then, we find an attractive price for a business. When we buy it, we would be happy if the market was closed for a few years; you wouldn’t get a price quote daily if you owned a farm. We look at expected yield, cost of taxes. If you buy a farm, you would look at the cost of fertilizers, what a farm produces relative to the purchase price, price per acre, production per acre, etc. We make judgments.

时不时地我们会找到一个对于某一门生意有吸引力的价格。当我们买入的时候如果这个市场也跟着封闭上几年就再好不过了。如果你拥有一个农场,你不可能每天都收到关于它的报价。我们关注的是农场内作物的预期产量,税务成本。如果你买了一个农场,你也会关注买化肥花了多少钱,农场的创收能不能与买入投资相抵,每英亩的买入价,每英亩的收成等等,然后再作出综合结论。

CM: Nothing to add. 

CM:我没什么要补充的了

WB: He’s been practicing for weeks. [laughter]

WB:那这可难为他攒了一星期的台词了(笑)

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

Time: 2008

来源:2008年BRK年会Boodel笔记

时间:2008年

---------------------------------------------------

[Q - In 2008 you highly recommended buying US stocks. What is your opinion on market going forward? What is reasonable rate of return?]

2008年您极力推荐购买美国本土股票,您对市场的未来走向有什么看法?以及合理的回报率是多少?

WB: I write articles on general level of market itself rarely, only 4 or 5 times in forty years. It turned out I was pretty premature in Oct 2008. But I felt it would be way better to own bonds or cash. I thought I would be eventually alright.

WB:我在过去的四十年里也就写过四五次关于市场整体水平的总结评价性文章。2008年10月所发生的事证明我还是太“前瞻”。但我仍然认为相比持有债券或现金还是持有股票比较好,起码最终会是一个稳定之选。

I have no idea what the stock market will do this week or next year. I do think I’d rather own equities than cash or 20yr bond over the long term. This is partly because I am unenthusiastic on alternatives. I think there will be a modest positive real return over time.

我不知道股票市场这周或明年会发生什么,我只觉得相对于持有20年债券或者现金我更乐意持有股票,这种想法部分来自于我对上述模棱两可的两个选项的态度并不乐观。我认为我的选择会有一个相对乐观的实际收益率。

CM: Equities are best of a bad lot of available opportunities. I think you are right, and people should get used to ordinary real returns – not exciting.

CM:我觉得你是对的,矬子里面拔将军的话股票会是最好的选择,人们也应该适应一个普通平淡的实际回报率,而不要为之过于乐观或狂躁。

WB: We like owning businesses. They do beat holding cash or 5, 10 or 20yr bonds.

WB:这就是为什么我们乐意参股持股,这确实比持有现金或者那些五年十年二十年的债券强多了。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes

Time: 2010

来源:2010年BRK年会Boodell笔记

时间:2010年

---------------------------------------------------

[Q -Is there a bear market coming?]

熊市是否即将来临?

Humans are still made up of the same psychological makeup, and opportunities will always present themselves. All these people have not gotten more rational. They are moved by fear and greed. But I'm never afraid of what I am doing.

大多数人的心态构成都差不多,随着机会的不断出现,人们也没有变得以更加理性去面对,仍然会受到恐惧和欲望的趋势,但我从不害怕我所做的。

Source: Student Visit 2005

Time: May 6, 2005

来源:2005年学生访问

时间:2005年5月6日

---------------------------------------------------

Clipboard Image.png

Opinion of forecasts?

您对于对于各式各样关于市场的预测有什么看法?

CM: People have always had this craving to have someone tell them the future. Long ago, kings would hire people to read sheep guts. There’s always been a market for people who pretend to know the future. Listening to today’s forecasters is just as crazy as when the king hired the guy to look at the sheep guts. It happens over and over and over.

CM:人们总希望有人能告知他们未来会发生什么。很久以前那些个三皇五帝啥的就会雇人瞅瞅羊的心肝脾肺来占卜。所以那些号称能预知未来的神棍总是有市场的。听听他们扯淡就知道这和古时候看羊肚子的货没啥区别,跟轮回似的周而复始,屡禁不绝。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes

Time: 2004

来源:2004年BRK年会Tilson笔记

时间:2004年

---------------------------------------------------

Comment on the 1998 market?

回过头看看1998年的市场,您对它有什么评价?

In 1998, there were incredible opportunities. Just like today, there were a lot of smart people with 150 IQs running around with lots of money, but there was a panic. 

1998年的时候有很多很不错的商业机遇,就像今时今日,那些个智商150往上的聪明人将大把银子玩弄于股掌。但是彼时有一股恐慌气氛蔓延开来。

For example, there was a 30 basis point difference in the yields of on-the-run and off-the-run 30-year Treasuries. Literally, a 29 1/2- year traded 30 basis points higher than a 30-year because of the slight liquidity difference. You could have made a lot going long one and short the other. You wouldn’t have thought this kind of thing was possible, but it happened.

举个例子,当时新发行国债和旧发行的30年期国债之间的收益差了30个基点,以准确数据来说就是29年半期的国债收益比30年期的收益高了30个基点就因为这轻微的流动时间差。你从未想象得到会发生这种此消彼长的事情会发生,但它确确实实发生了。

The high-yield market went crazy as well. In the span of only 14 months, you had yields go from 25%-60% to 7%. [Buffett put up the following chart.]

与此同时高收益市场也炸锅了,短短14个月的时间里收益率从25%-60%降到了7%。(Buffett随之放了一个表格数据来佐证)

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes

Time: 2005

来源:2005年BRK年会Tilson笔记

时间:2005年

---------------------------------------------------

Do you think the current rally is for real?

您认为当下的股市是确确实实回暖了吗?

What's going to happen tomorrow, huh? Let me give you an illustration. I bought my first stock in 1942. I was 11. I had been dillydallying up until then. I got serious. What do you think the best year for the market has been since 1942? Best calendar year from 1942 to the present time. Well, there's no reason for you to know the answer. 

明天会发生什么?让我来给你举个例子,1942年我11岁的时候买了我的第一支股票,在那之前我一直焦虑,严格来说你认为从1942年到现在哪一年的股票市场最好?嗯,毫无疑问你肯定不知道。

The answer is 1954. In 1954, the Dow … dividends was up 50%. Now if you look at 1954, we were in a recession a good bit of that time. The recession started in July of '53. Unemployment peaked in September of '54. So until November of '54 you hadn't seen an uptick in the employment figure. And the unemployment figure more than doubled during that period. It was the best year there was for the market. 

答案是1954年,那一年道琼斯指数上涨了50%,但现在再看那一年,我们正处在经济衰退时期,衰退从1953年7月开始,1954年9月失业率达到最高点,到当年的11月都未见好转,那段时期失业率翻了整整一倍,但那是股票市场最好的一年。

So it's a terrible mistake to look at what's going on in the economy today and then decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on it. You should decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on how much you're getting for your money, long-term value you're getting for your money at any given time. And next week doesn't make any difference because next week, next week is going to be a week further away. And the important thing is to have the right long-term outlook, evaluate the businesses you are buying. And then a terrible market or a terrible economy is your friend.

所以用股票市场的好坏来判断经济状况是一种非常错误的方式。你买入或者卖出股票取决于你现在的经济状况和你投入的金钱在任何给定时间段中的长期收益。下一周会如何并不重要,因为这是一周后的事。当下最重要的事是要有一个长期的远景规划。评估你买入的生意,把糟糕的市场或者糟糕的经济当做你的朋友。

 I don't care, in making a purchase of the Burlington Northern, I don't care whether next week, or next month or even next year there is a big revival in car loadings or any of that sort of thing. A period like this gives me a chance to do things. It's silly to wait. I wrote an article. If you wait until you see the robin, spring will be over.

在制定买入伯灵顿北方公司计划的时候我不在意车载物流行业之类的会不会在一周、一个月甚至一年后有起色。这段时间是一个让我有所作为的机会,等待是愚蠢的,一年之计在于春,如果你一直等,等到知更鸟出现,春天也该过完了。

Source: Buffett & Gates at Columbia Business School

Time: November 12th 2009

来源:Buffett和Gates在哥伦比亚商学院

时间:2009年11月12日

----------------------------------------------------

[In response to a shareholder expressing the many reasons why he is concerned about the future outlook for the economy and the market, Buffett replied:]

当问及对股东为何对未来的经济和股票市场发展前景如此关心所阐释出的种种理由有什么看法时,Buffett回答:

I would say that at any given point in history, including when stocks were the cheapest, you could have found an equally impressive list of negatives. In ‘74, you could have written down all kinds of things that would show the future would be terrible.

我想说在历史上的任何给定时间点,包括股价最低廉的时期,你会发现有很多唱衰的呻吟存在,1974年的时候你能找出一大堆的理由来预测未来会一团糟。

We don’t pay any attention to this kind of thing. Our underlying premise is that this country will do very well and that businesses will do very well. We used nuclear bombs, endured the cold war, etc., but over time the opportunities have won out over the problems. I expect this will continue, barring use [against us of] weapons of mass destruction – it would be hard for businesses to win out over this.

对这种类似的行为我们毫不关心,我们所坚信的一个基本前提是我们相信国家和经济状况都会发展良好,我们扔过核弹,我们捱过冷战时期,随着时间推移,机遇总会战胜那些种种问题,我期待能够继往开来。除非有人对我们使用大规模杀伤性武器,那样的话商业生意什么的就玩完了。

Going back to ‘59, I can’t think of any discussions Charlie and I have had in which we’ve passed on something because of a view on macro conditions. It won’t be the economy that will do in investors; it will be investors themselves. If you’d just owned stocks over time, you’d do fine. We’re unaffected by the variables that you mentioned. Show us a good business tomorrow and we’ll jump.

让我们回看1959年,我能想起任何一场我和Charlie之间基于宏观条件的看法所展开的讨论。不是经济会对投资者做什么,而是投资者本身怎么做。如果你长时间持有股票,你可能会做的不错。我们完全不受那些所谓变量的影响。如果明天有一个好的商业机会摆在眼前,我们依旧会义无反顾出手。

[CM: We wouldn’t be surprised if professionally managed money in the US will have unimpressive returns relative to the high returns we had until three years ago.

CM:如果过去三年美国专业管理的基金绩效表现远低于我们,我们一点都不会感到讶异。

Our expectations were more modest than most three years ago [see Buffett’s Fortune article, Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market, 11/99]. We didn’t project the end of the world, but said anyone who thought they could sit at home and day trade to double digit returns was living in a fool’s paradise. It’s hard to understand how people could believe such things. To some extent, they’re sold these beliefs.

我们的期望比三年前更温和,我们的规划也没长远到世界末日,但是如果有人妄想在家坐着就把钱挣了的话那可谓痴人说梦。很难理解为什么会有人相信这些。在某种程度上说这种想法也算是被推销出去的。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes

Time: 2004

来源2004年BRK年会Tilson笔记

时间:2004年

----------------------------------------------------

What do you think of the current market? (2000)

您怎么看待当下的市场(2000年)

Can see anything in markets. Don't see any cases of incredible under valuation, if we did find it they probably will have been bought out.

着眼于市场中的所有事情,但不要纠结于那些过低的估值,如果有,它们可能是被买断了。

[CM: Present time is a very unusual period. Residential real estate and common stock value grew so quickly.]

CM:现阶段是一个非常时期,房地产和普通股价增长得真快。

Company's that themselves couldn't borrow 100 million and is worth billions. Most extreme time period, even including the 1920's.

价值数十亿的公司却借不来一个亿,历史上有这样的极端时期,甚至包括上世纪20年代。

[CM: I think it's the most extreme period since modern capitalism, the 30's created worst depression in 600 years. This time period is almost as extreme as 30's but in a different direction.]

CM:我觉得这是现代资本主义发展以来最极端的时期。上世纪30年代发生了600年中最严重的大萧条,现在的情况跟那时候差不多一样极端只不过角度不同。

Doesn't make it easy to predict an outcome. No question in last year the ability to monetize shareholder ignorance has been exceeded.

这并未使得预测结果变得简单。毫无疑问去年股东们赚钱的能力又增强了。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2000

Time: April 29th 2000

来源:2000年BRK年会

时间:2000年4月29日

-------------------------------------------------