巴菲特眼中的出海投资:Foreign Investments(下)

2017-02-28 16:11 7heaHAN 阅读 31177

许多投资者都跟格隆汇平台反应希望能多看到价值投资的内容,为此格隆汇特意组织力量按照问题由浅至深的顺序汇总并翻译了巴菲特及其挚友查理芒格近几年在各大公开场合回答的关于估值的问题。您即将看到的可能是史上最全股神问答整理,希望对您有所帮助。

巴菲特眼中的出海投资:Foreign Investments(上)

续:

Investing in Africa?

在欧洲投资如何?

[Q - In respect to Africa how would you find above average stocks given the information costs and limitations in Africa? What is your best advice about obtaining acceptable information? ]

[在非洲你是怎么找到有价值的股票信息的?您对于获取相关资讯有什么建议]

There arent too many companies in Africa that are big enough for Berkshire to look at, except for maybe DeBeers, Anglo-American, or SAB Miller. Also, there isnt a lot of information on these companies. I know South Africa has stock information available. The key is to get good information.

对于Berkshire来说在非洲没有太多足够规模的公司值得投资,除了DeBeers, Anglo-American, SAB Miller,但同时对于这些公司也没有太多的信息可供参考,我知道南非有一些股票信息,但关键是要找到其中有价值的部分

In comparison, Korea has plenty of information available. There is Kissline online. Within seconds I can get Korean Stock Exchange Information, Annual and even quarterly information. Im not sure if the same is available online for South Africa. This is OK because I dont need to win every game, just the ones I play.

相比之下,韩国有大量的相关信息,依靠便捷的网络我们能在眨眼间找到大量的韩国股票交易市场信息,年度的甚至季度的都有,但是在南非,网络上就没有这么便捷了,这也无所谓,我不需要在每一笔生意上都是赢家,在我投入的生意上盈利就够了。

I have three mailboxes in my office IN, OUT, and TOO HARD. I was joking with the MIT students that I should have a TOO HARD bin and they made me one, so now I have it and I use it. I will only swing at pitches that I really like. If you do it 10 times in your life, youll be rich. You should approach investing like you have a punch card with 20 punch-outs, one for each trade in your life. I think people would be better off if they only had 10 opportunities to buy stocks throughout their lifetime. You know what would happen? They would make sure that each buy was a good one. They would do lots and lots of research before they made the buy. You dont have to have many 4X growth opportunities to get rich. You dont need to do too much, but the environment makes you feel like you need to do something all the time.

在我的办公室有三个邮箱,就是买入,卖出还有太难了啥也干不了,我曾经跟一群麻省理工的学生开玩笑说我应该有一个“太难了”邮箱然后他们还真给我做了一个,所以我就把它投入使用啦,我只会在我确定它是好球的时候才出手,如果你来上这么十次,你这辈子就衣食无忧了,你应该接近那种穿糖葫芦般的投资机会,像多米诺骨牌一样。我觉得那种一辈子只有十次买股票机会的人应该收手不干,因为你知道在这种人身上会发生什么吗,他们会试图每一次买入都是明智的,他们会在买入之前做大量的功课,你不需要有那么多4倍增长率的投资机会来使你富有,你不需要做太多,但是环境会使得你觉得你要做好多好多研究。

Source: Student Visit 2007

Time: January 2007

来源2007年学生访问

时间20071

May I ask you your reasons for coming to Germany?

我可以问一下您来德国的理由吗

WB: We want more family owners of German businesses. We want more owners who, when they think of the need to monetize, have Berkshire on their radar screen. We arent as prominent in Germany as we are in the US. We are looking for good companies and we want them to know us. We should be better known in a month.

WB:在德国的业务上我们想要更多的家庭规模的持有者,我们想要更多的对渴望赚钱的持有者,将Berkshire纳入他们的考虑之中,诚然我们在德国的知名度和影响力并不像在美国那么突出,但是我们仍然在努力寻找优秀的公司,我们也试图扩大自己的知名度,相信在几个月内我们应该可以做到这一点

CM: Germany is particularly impressivean advanced civilization, especially in engineering and industrials, with German advancement and inventiveness. It is amazing the impact Germans have had on field after field in America. Look at all the machines in factories with German names.

CM:德国是个令人印象深刻的国家,先进的文明,尤其是在工业和工程领域,有着德意志特有的进步和创新精神。同时这个国家的工业成果在美国本土的影响力也进一步加深,瞧瞧那些德国制造的机器吧。

WB: Sounds like Charlie should go to Germany.

WB:听起来Charlie应该去德国

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

Time: 2008

来源2008BRK年会Boodell笔记

Are you concerned with the effects of foreign economies and their weak currencies? These have played a role in Coca-Cola’s profitability recently - and Coke is trading at P/E multiple of 75. (1999)

你担心国外经济的不景气和薄弱的货币流所带来的影响吗?他们已影响到了可口可乐的盈利,它们的的股票在75PE的高位出售。

I don’t have anything to offer on selling Coke [as an investment]. The dollar [and other currencies relative to the dollar] doesn’t concern me; it doesn’t affect my decision. In the last couple of years, yes, the dollar’s strength has hurt. But it’s in Coke’s best interests to have countries do well in the long run, to grow and increase the income of its population. The share of market and what we call the “share of mind”are the important things in Coke’s business.

It’s true that case growth slowed last year and continues to be slow, but that’s happened before. We’ll be around with Coke ten years from now.

对于卖出可口可乐我没有什么可注资美元也不是我所关心的它们影响不了我的决策近几年来,美元的影响力在下跌,但它始终是可口可乐公司在长期运作中所关注的重点问题,为的是提高自身的盈利与收入。此外这个品牌在市场上的影响力,也就是所谓的“心智占有率”也在可口可乐的商业计划中扮演重要角色。即使从去年开始可口可乐的盈利增长率开始进入了一个慢速增长的时期,但我们会不离不弃的在今后十年里支持这个公司。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1999

Time: 1999

来源1999BRK年会

时间:1999

Do you foresee Berkshire buying any businesses in India or China in the near future?

您能预测一下在不远的将来Berkshire在中国或者印度可能买入的业务吗?

WB: We would like to. The odds are somewhat against buying anything outside of the USA. MiTek has possibilities outside the USA. If we get lucky, well buy one or two businesses in the next 3 or 4 years. Where theyll be, who knows? We wouldnt rule it out. We looked at insurance in India and China, but they restrict ownership in any domestic insurance company. The limit is 25% in China, and I think 25% in India. We probably dont want to go in to own [only] 25%. We want to have more ownership to make it worthwhile. You will see the day that Berkshire owns businesses, in my view, in both countries.

WB:嗯有可能,不过相对于买入美国以外的业务,MiTek在海外市场也有着无限可能,如果幸运的话,我们在今后三四年可能会买入一两个业务。谁知道到底是哪一个呢。我们不会排除这种可能性,目前来说我们正在寻找印度和中国的保险业务公司,但是他们对国外公司的股权持有比例有限制,中国是25%,印度也应该是这个比例,但我们不想被限制在这个比例。我们想要更高的比例来使他发挥最大盈利作用。在不远的将来我们希望能在这两个国家都做到这一点

CM: Nothing to add.

CM:我没有要补充的了

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes

Time: 2008

来源2008BRK年会Boodell笔记

时间:2008

Please talk about Greece, the future of the Euro and fiscal discipline in the world. Greece and other countries are clearly in trouble and BRK has investments in Europe. How is BRK positioned for currency failures? What is your advice to investors regarding the future of the Euro?

谈谈希腊吧,这个国家也算是欧元的未来和世界财政纪律的一个缩影,很明显希腊等国家现在正处在麻烦之中而且BRK也在欧洲有投资。BRK在现在欧洲货币政策的不利情况下扮演一个什么样的角色?关于欧元区的未来趋势您对投资者们有什么建议?

WB: Charlie and I havent talked about Greece recently, Im interested in his opinion. We have a lot of exposure in many countries, but we have it both on asset and liability side. We have much net worth in euro assets, but also substantial liabilities in Euro as well. When we reinsured Equitas we took on billions of liabilities around the world and we were paid in USD. If Euro depreciates we benefit with Equitas, but we lose on other areas. I cant tell you our net exposure on Euro or Sterlign on any given day, we have no dramatic exposures in any currency. Doesnt mean it isnt important. Charlie will now clearly explain how important the Greek situation is and its affect on the global economy. [laughter]

WB:Charlie和我最近没怎么讨论过希腊问题。我倒是对他的想法还蛮感兴趣,我们在欧洲的很多国家都有生意,有净资产也有负债,也就是说资本净值和潜在负债并存。这种情况是从我们对Equitas保证要以美元支付世界各地多达数十亿美元的债务做对赌开始的,如果欧元贬值,我们就盈利,但是我们在其他地区失算了,我目前还不能透露相关的关于欧元和英镑的这支交易的净曝险部位,目前我们对于欧洲地区的货币情况没有太大的曝险的危险。但这并不意味着不重要,Charlie和我现在打算详细地解释一下希腊的情况和它目前的现状对世界级经济所产生的影响。

CM: We are generally agnostic about currencies, about relative values. We are not agnostic about direction. Greece is an interesting example. Past conservatism in US gave the country wonderful credit. We used it to win World War II, help Germany and Japan in one of the most constructive foreign policy decisions in history of world. Now the US doesnt have as good credit since it has been using it so heavily. Greece is just a start. It is dangerous when governments push their credit so hard. When you have blown it in past, its not as good today. Responsible voices are realizing we are nearer trouble from lack of government credit than ever before in my lifetime.

CM:通常情况下我们对货币的情况是不可知的,但对于其相对价值我们还是有一个思路的。希腊是一个有意思的例子。过去我们的保守主义政策使我们拥有了很好的信誉,我们也因此成了二战中的赢家,战后帮助德国和日本重建的海外也是我们历史上最有建设性的举措之一,但现在我们的信誉不如从前般靠谱因为我们可能透支的太多,希腊问题只是一个开始,当ZF过于依赖这一点的时候就会很危险,有些东西搞砸过一次的话可能直至今日这种恶劣影响也无法修复。外界对于我们应该负起应负的责任的生意提醒我们正接近于因为ZF缺乏公信力所引起的前所未见的麻烦。

WB: You have to distinguish between borrowers in their own currency (like US and Japan) and those who borrow in other currencies because creditors dont trust them. When weaker credits borrow in other currencies, it can really put you out of business really quickly. They cant print USD. That has caused failures. The EU it is a really interesting situation. Greece is sovereign but cant print their own currency – they have Euro. Euro was an experiment, and it is a test case playing out here – of a country using a common currency but is sovereign on promises to citizens. I dont know how it ends, but Im not forecasting anything I just try not to watch movies like that. This will be high drama. We dont make big currency plays, and we did one a few years ago and did okay. I would say this - that events of last few years make me more bearish on ALL currencies holding value over time. If you really could run deficits of 10% of GDP and do it a long time world would have done it more, because that is really fun! Most understand it cant be kept up. How world weans itself off deficit financing will be interesting to watch. As long as US borrows in USD, there is no possibility of default. If world wont take USD debt, we have problem. You dont default when you print your own currency.

WB:你必须辨别出谁是本国货币的借款人谁是借外汇的借款人因为后者不被债权人所信任,当借自外汇的款项变为坏账,这种情况会很快让你从生意中出局,美元都印不出来,很可能会造成麻烦。欧元区---他们的情况比较有意思,这个希腊属于一个主权国家但是它却不能印发自己的货币,他们只有欧元,欧元区是一个大环境,也是一块试验田,身在其中的国家需使用共同货币欧元,但与他们之前作为主权国家对公民的承诺相悖,我都不知道这该如何收场。我也不会去胡乱预测未来的情况,如果这是一场电影,我肯定不会看这样的电影因为这太特么戏剧化了。我们从不在货币生意上搞大动作,前几年做的几个状况还可以。我想说前几年的情况让我对货币能否坚挺持悲观态度。如果你真的能拿达到GDP10%的财政赤字这么一直玩下去的话,上帝会让你知道他玩的更狠因为这太特么有意思了,谁都知道这不可能一直持续下去。看世界各国如何各尽所能摆脱财政赤字是一件很有意思的事,只要我们自己借的是美元,就没啥违约的可能性,但是如果世界不吃美国国债这一套就危险了,我们不能自己印自己的货币自己欠自己的钱。

CM: Published statistics are misleading. Debts are stated in government bonds outstanding. The unfunded promises are miles bigger than bonds outstanding. They dont bind if you grow GDP at 3% per annum per person, but if you get to where growth stops, you will have enormous social strains, and god knows what the impacts will be.

CM:发布的统计数据是一种误导,债务是ZF债券的一种突出表现,而未备基金承诺比这个债券更大件事。如果每年人均GDP增长率达到3%的话这俩玩意就不在一块绑定了。但是如果增长陷入停滞社会压力可就大了,到时候上帝才知道会发生什么。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes

Time: 2010

来源:2010BRK年会Boodell笔记

时间2010

What is the most important thing you learn from China?

您从中国学到的最宝贵的东西是什么

WB: China is an amazing economy. Growth on a per capita basis is amazing. There were 290M people in 1790 (and only 4M in the US) in China but for some reason for 170 yrs very little progress was made. The potential of the Chinese is now being realized. It is a sight to behold. However, they havent taught me to eat Chinese food.

WB:中国的经济情况一片大好。人均经济基础资本增长势头惊人。1790年中国的人口就有2.9亿(当时美国才400万),由于某种原因往后的170年里发展比较缓慢,但现在中国的增长潜力得以显现出来。我们拭目以待。不过话说回来他们还没教会我咋吃中餐。

CM: China has some very rare people in BYD. No other lesson is as important as that one.

CM:中国在比亚迪汽车的新能源项目投入了很多,这非常值得我们借鉴。

WB: Sprite outsells Coke 2:1 in China. Amazing economy, growth will last a long time. In 1790, there were 4mil people in the US, and 290m in China. And there was very little growth in quality of living in China over those 200 years through 1990. They have major resources of land and minerals. Potential of Chinese is huge. Charlie and I are going over there at the end of September.

WB:雪碧的销售量在中国是可口可乐的两倍。出色的经济增长率在很长一段时间里都将持续,1790年的时候美国有400万人而中国有2.9亿,但是中国人的生活品质从那时开始直到20世纪90年代的二百年的时间里都没有显著的提升,不过这个国家有辽阔的版图和丰富的自然资源,潜力巨大,Charlie和我九月底的时候要过去一趟。

CM: I always knew Chinese people had potential for huge and rapid progress. I could see in Chinese Americans. They came to America as coolies or slaves, and they rose so fast. I underrated how fast it could happen they are setting record for advancement of human civilization.

CM:我一直都知道中国有巨大的潜力去快速发展,我看到那些美籍华人,彼时他们远渡重洋以苦力和奴隶的身份来到美国。但他们逆袭得很快,我低估了他们发家致富的速度。他们在人类文明的发展史上也算写下了浓墨重彩的一笔

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes

Time: 2010

来源:2010BRK年会Boodell笔记

时间:2010

How will Buffett invest in China in the future? What will happen to the purchasing power of Chinas large holdings in U.S. Treasuries?

Buffett先生未来将在中国如何投资?中国巨大的购买力对美国国债的持有会带来什么影响?

Buffett: We respond to opportunities as we see them. We will see things to do over time. Some things are restricted to U.S. [investors] in China. We cant own more than 24.9% of an insurance company in China. China is a huge market. We would have bought more than 10% of BYD, if they had let us. If we run a $250 billion trade deficit with China, they have $250 billion to do something with. The Chinese cant get rid of their dollar holdings. Chinese dollar assets will increase as long as they run a [trade] surplus with the U.S. To date, theyve acquired mostly U.S. government bonds. Its a major problem for them to decide what to do with U.S. dollars. Anyone who owns dollar obligations outside the U.S. will have less purchasing power in the future.

Buffett:一旦我们发现机遇我们就会去应对,我们会静观其变,有些因素会对美国的投资者在中国的投资行为造成影响,例如我们不能在中国的保险业公司里持有股权超过24.9%。中国是一个巨大的市场。如果我们买入比亚迪股份的10%,如果他们允许的话。如果我们运行一个250亿规模的对华贸易逆差,他们就会有250亿的资金流来做点什么。中国不会减持美元,中国的美元外汇储备会在他们运行对美贸易顺差的情况下持续增长。中国目前是美国国债的最大持有国,他们如何应对这一点是一个富有挑战性的重点问题。任何一个美国以外的国家拥有美元债务,都会降低他们在未来的购买力

Munger: If I were a Chinese finance minister, I would do what theyre doing. China has one of the most progressive economic policies in the world. I have nothing but admiration for Chinese economic policies. They will be very hard to compete with all over the world.

Munger:如果我是中国的财政部长,我会跟他们现在所做的一样,当下中国的经济政策是全世界最有建设性的经济政策之一。我对此表示非常钦佩,同时也对他们的竞争力表示叹服。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2009 Bruni Notes

Time: 2009

来源2009BRK年会Bruni笔记

时间:2009

Why is car insurance business not expanding globally? Why not China?

为什么汽车保险业务没有扩展到全球例如中国

WB: Weve known for a long time that there is no shortage of drivers around the world. In China and India, we can only own a 24.9% stake, so wed rather have our managers work hard on 100% than 24.9%. We have gone from 2.5% to 8% market share in Geico. We dont think we can build those advantages in other markets in any reasonable time. I agree with Tonys decision that now and probably for a long time to come that there is so much opportunity here in the US that we arent as interested in other places. Though we keep looking, and are well aware of possibilities. We didnt not go because we didnt know there were cars there.

WB:很长时间以来我就知道全世界范围内都不缺开车的,在中国和印度我们只能在保险公司类企业持有最多24.9%的股份。在Geico我们的市场份额才能从2.5%增长到了8%,我们并不认为我们可以在一个合理期限内在海外其他市场取得同样的优势。我同意Tony的决定因为美国本土市场仍然有很多的增长机会所以还不到我们插手海外市场的时候。即使我们没有放弃寻找和感知各种海外市场商业上的可能性,但我们知道还不到动手的时候,因为我们不知道那边的车市是个什么情况。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2010 Boodell Notes

Time: 2010

来源:2010BRK年会Boodell笔记

时间:2010

What are your thoughts about Japan?

您对日本有什么想法

My thoughts about Japan? I am not a macro guy. Now I say to myself Berkshire Hathaway can borrow money in Japan for 10 years at one percent. One percent! I say gee, I took Graham's class 45 years ago and I have been working hard at this all my life maybe I can earn more than 1% annually, it doesn't seem impossible. I wouldn't want to get involved in currency risk, so it would have to be Yen-denominated. I would have to be in Japanese Real Estate or Japanese companies or something of the sort and all I have to do is beat one percent. That is all the money is going to cost me and I can get it for 10 years. So far I haven't found anything. It is kind of interesting. The Japanese businesses earn very low returns on equity - 4% to 5% - 6% on equity and it is very hard to earn a lot as an investor when the business you are in doesn't earn very much money.

我对日本市场的想法?我不是一个好高骛远的人,我对我自己说Berkshire Hathaway可以在日本借钱,十年期,年利率1%,1%,艾玛,我45年前上Graham的课然后我努力工作了一辈子估计我这每年能挣的比这1%多。看起来不太可能,我本身也不太想掺和进货币风险中。所以日本问题必须日元解决,我想在日本的房地产市场或者日本公司搞一搞,至少干掉这1%,需要注入的资金我应该能在十年内搞定。到目前为止我啥都没发现。这也有点意思。在日本做生意股本回报率很低,也就百分之456的样子,这对于投资者来说可不是什么诱人的市场因为几近无利可图。

Now some people do it. In fact, I have a friend, Walter Schloss, who worked at Graham at the same time I did. And it was the first way I went at stocks to buy stocks selling way below working capital. A very cheap, quantitative approach to stocks. I call it the cigar butt approach to investing. You walk down the street and you look around for a cigar butt someplace. Finally you see one and it is soggy and kind of repulsive, but there is one puff left in it. So you pick it up and the puff is free--it is a cigar butt stock. You get one free puff on it and then you throw it away and try another one. It is not elegant. But it works. Those are low return businesses.

不过现在有人开始做了事实上我有个朋友Walter Schloss,跟我当时一块在Graham学习的,这是我第一次买股价低于营运成本的股票,一支非常便宜的股票,我称之为雪茄屁股般的投资。就如街上随处可见的雪茄屁股一样。最后你看见了一支又湿又恶心的,不过里边还有那么一口可抽的,所以你捡起来吸掉那一口,就这么以此类推,很下三滥但是管点用,这就是所谓的低回报生意。

But time is the friend of the wonderful business; it is the enemy of the lousy business. If you are in a lousy business for a long time, you will get a lousy result even if you buy it cheap. If you are in a wonderful business for a long time, even if you pay a little bit too much going in you will get a wonderful result if you stay in a long time.

但是时间是一个好生意的朋友也是一个垃圾生意的敌人如果你陷在一门垃圾生意中太久你最后得到的结果也是垃圾的即使你投入很少反过来如果你参与的是一个好生意即使一开始投入的有点多但是随着时间推移你会得到一个好结果

I find very few wonderful businesses in Japan at present. They may change the culture in some way so that management gets more share holder responsive over there and stock returns are higher. At the present time you will find a lot of low return businesses and that was true even when the Japanese economy was booming. It is amazing; they had an incredible market without incredible companies. They were incredible in terms of doing a lot of business, but they were not incredible in terms of the return on equity that they achieved and that has finally caught up with them. So we have so far done nothing there. But as long as money is 1% there, we will keep looking.

目前我在日本很少能发现好生意也许以后会有改观管理者们会得到更多的股票持有人,风险平摊,股票的收益也会更高目前你能找到的只是大批的低回报生意即使现在的日本经济情况不赖这很有意思他们有一个不赖的市场却没有优秀的公司他们只是高度规律化的做生意投入很多回报率却不高所以目前我们不想进入日本市场但只要有1%的商机在那里,我们也会继续观察。

Source: Lecture at the University of Florida Business School

Time: October 15th 1998

来源:佛罗里达大学商学院演讲

时间:19981015

Does the Japanese economy affect your outlook?

日本的经济状况会影响你未来的商业远景吗

We dont really concern ourselves with the macro issues. We cant rely on the macro to bail us out of a wrong decision on a [specific] business.

我们不会因为一些虚无缥缈的宏观问题影响自己我们也不可能能依靠假大空的理论来解决我们的具体问题

Look at Sees Candies. We bought it in 1972 and look what happened right afterwards. In 1973, the Arab oil embargo happened. Then inflation, followed by political turmoil. If we would have had a road map of 1972 to 1982, we’d have seen more inflation, a 20% prime rate, worldwide dissension. But knowing all those macro issues wouldnt have helped us make a better decision to buy Sees Candies. Its just more important to recognize a great business when you see it than it is to predict macro issues.

来看一下Sees糖果,我们在1972年买入然后静观其变,1973年阿拉伯国家开始搞石油禁运,然后开始通货膨胀,政治环境也跟着开始动荡起来。如果我们有一个预知1972年到1982年的时间节点测绘图。我们会看到更多的通货膨胀,20%多的最优利率,还有全球纠纷什么的,但是即使提前知道这些全球化问题,也不会使我们在是否购入Sees糖果上做出更好的决策。这说明去分辨出一门赚钱的生意,要比关注那些空虚的宏观问题更加重要。

Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1999

Time: 1999

来源:1999BRK年会

时间:1999